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A Legal Definition of the Stepfamily: The 
Example of Incest Regulation 
Afargaret AI. Afahoney* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A growing number of Americans are members of 
stepfamilies. According to the 1990 Census, approximately five 
and one-half million married-couple households included at 
least one stepchild under age eighteen. 1 This number 
constituted twenty-nine percent of the married couple 
households with children, and six percent of total households 
counted in the census.2 A total of 7,208,000 stepchildren 
resided in these families. 3 Demographers predict that a high 
percentage of American children, perhaps one in three, can be 
expected to spend some childhood years in a stepfamily.4 
To date, state lawmakers have been slow to recognize the 
relationships created between stepparents and their 
stepchildren. This result is consistent with the traditional 
limitation of family status in American law to married couples 
and to parents and their biologic or adopted children. Most of 
the important legal issues that affect family members, in such 
areas as child support, custody, inheritance, torts, workers' 
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law; B.A., LeMoyne 
College; J.D., University of Michigan. 
1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. P23-180, 
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE IN THE 1990'S, tbl. L at 10 (October 1992) 
[hereinafter CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS]. 
2 See id. (reporting 19,598,000 married-couple households with biological and 
adopted children in 1990); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEp'T OF COMMERCE, 
PuB. No. 61, 1991 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: HOUSEHOLDS--
STATES: 1980 AND 1990, at 48 (reporting a total of 91,947,000 households in 1990). 
3 CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, supra note 1, tbl. L at 10. 
4 See Paul C. Glick, Remarried Families, Stepfamilies and Stepchildren: A 
Brief Demographic Profile, 38 FAM. REL. 24, 26 (1989) (basing projection about 
future number of stepchildren on statistics regarding the likelihood of parenthood, 
divorce, and remarriage among young married persons); see also Frank F. 
Furstenberg, Jr., The New Extended Family: The Experience of Parents and 
Children after Remarriage, in REMARRIAOE AND STEPPARENTING 42, 44 (Kay Pasley 
& Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman eds., 19R7) (placing estimate at one in four children). 
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compensation, and criminal law, are regulated at the state 
level. Here, the starting premise is that stepparents and their 
stepchildren are legal strangers to each other. Although the 
state courts and legislatures have, from time to time, 
recognized limited exceptions to this principle, no 
comprehensive definition of the stepparent-child status has 
been formulated. 
II. FORMULATING A LEGAL DEFINITION OF THE STEPF AMILY 
The denial of family status to stepparents and stepchildren 
has produced a significant gap between legal norms and the 
actual family experiences of many people in our society. In 
recent years, many scholars have criticized the exclusion of 
nontraditional families, including stepfamilies, from the 
protection of the law.5 This type of criticism is the first 
important step in evaluating the laws governing relationships 
within the stepfamily. The next step involves fashioning a new 
stepparent-child status, which would protect stepfamily 
members in appropriate cases while preserving a family law 
system that is fair, certain, predictable, and not unduly 
burdensome on those who must enforce the laws. In defining 
the stepparent-child status, two important questions must be 
answered. First, what constitutes a legally significant 
stepparent-child relationship? Second, what rights and 
responsibilities should be associated with stepfamily 
membership? 
A. Identifying Legally Significant Stepparent-Child 
Relationships 
The Census Bureau has answered the first of these ques-
tions in a very straightforward manner. For the purpose of 
counting the number of households with stepchildren, a step-
parent-child relationship is formed whenever an individual 
5 See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive 
Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family 
Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984); Mark A. Fine, A Soctal Science Perspective 
on Stepfamily Law: Suggestions for Legal Reform, 38 FAM. REL. 53 (1989); Marie 
Witkin Kargman, Stepchild Support Obligations of Stepparents, 32 FAM. REL. 231 
(1983); Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and 
Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917 (1989); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have 
Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian· 
Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990). 
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marries the custodial parent of a minor child and thereafter 
resides with the child.6 This same approach to identifying step-
parent-child relationships is taken in some of the state laws 
that confer certain burdens and benefits on stepfamily mem-
bers. For example, the Missouri stepparent support statute 
provides in a straightforward manner that "[a] stepparent shall 
support his or her stepchild to the same extent that a natural 
or adoptive parent is required to support his or her child so 
long as the stepchild is living in the same home as the steppar-
ent."7 
Many scholars and lawmakers, however, have concluded 
that something more than marriage and a shared residence 
should be required before legal consequences attach to the step-
parent-child relationship; the additional criteria generally re-
late to the nature of the relationships actually established over 
time in a stepfamily. According to this analysis, legal rights 
and duties should exist only if the residential stepparent as-
sumes an active custodial role; for example, by participating in 
the child's education, discipline, and moral training, or by mak-
ing financial contributions to the child's support. Once estab-
lished in this manner, the stepparent-child status may endure 
beyond the child's age of majority. 
The courts in this country have developed a legal standard, 
called the "in loco parentis" doctrine, which embodies this re-
quirement of active participation by the stepparent. "In loco 
parentis," which in Latin means "in the place of a parent," 
applies not only to stepfamilies, but in any situation where an 
adult informally assumes custodial responsibility for a child. 
The courts have applied the doctrine, however, in a selective 
fashion in terms of subject matter. For example, stepparents 
who stand in loco parentis to their stepchildren have frequently 
been accorded the same treatment as biologic parents in the 
6 Notably, the Census Bureau's defmition of stepfamily does not include the 
situation where an adult marries the noncustodial parent of minor children; the 
new spouse here is not regarded as a stepparent. In a similar fashion, discussions 
about stepfamilies in the legal context have, for the most part, been limited in 
scope to residential stepparent-child relationships. But see Rosenberg v. Silver, 762 
F.2d 255, 256 (2d Cir. 1985) (recognizing defense of parent-child tort immunity for 
the husband of an injured child's noncustodial mother, who did not reside with the 
child). Furthermore, the defmitions can become blurred in families where unmar-
ried parents share the joint legal and physical custody of their children. Arguably, 
upon the marriage of either parent in this situation, the new spouse would be 
regarded as a stepparent under the Census Bureau's defmition of that term. 
7 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.400 (Vernon 1986). 
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areas of workers' compensation8 and parent-child tort immuni-
ty,9 but not in the areas of inheritance10 and wrongful 
death. 11 
Like the common law in loco parentis doctrine, a number 
of state statutes that confer limited rights upon stepfamilies for 
specific purposes apply only if the stepparent and child are 
bound together by more than the stepparent's marriage to the 
child's parent. For example, the New Jersey inheritance tax 
statute establishes preferential rates and exemptions for be-
quests made to "any child to whom the decedent ... stood in 
the mutually acknowledged relation of a parent, provided such 
relationship began at or before the child's fifteenth birthday 
and was continuous for ten years thereafter.'m Similarly, the 
crime of "[s]exual abuse by a parent, guardian or custodian" in 
the West Virginia Code applies to "the spouse" of a parent 
"where such spouse ... shares actual physical possession or 
care and custody of a child with the parent.''13 Each of these 
statutory standards, like the common law in loco parentis stan-
dard, requires the assumption of some form of responsibility by 
the stepparent before legal rights and responsibilities are Im-
posed. 
B. Legal Rights and Responsibilities in the Stepfamily 
Once the limitations on legally significant stepparent-child 
relationships have been set under the in loco parentis doctrine 
or some other standard, the remaining questions involve the 
scope of legal rights and responsibilities within the stepfamily. 
The logical starting point in this analysis is that qualifying 
8 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.265(6) (Supp. 1992) (establishing eligibility 
of child for workers' compensation benefits when the deceased employee stood in 
loco parentis to the child for at least one year before the time of injury). 
9 See, e.g., Bricault v. Deveau, 157 A.2d 604, 605 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1960) 
(stating that the justifications for family immunity are "as applicable to a stepfa-
ther who stands in loco parentis to a stepson as they are to the father-son rela-
tionship"). 
10 See, e.g., In re Berge's Estate, 47 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Minn. 1951) (ruling 
that stepdaughters were not "heirs" of their deceased stepfather, even though he 
stood in loco parentis toward them). 
11 See, e.g., Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 524 P.2d 801, 803 (Cal. 1974) (hold-
ing that stepdaughter was not a beneficiary under the wrongful death statute de-
spite the fact that the decedent stepfather had "assumed the full obligation of 
father and parent" before his death). The California legislature overruled this 
decision with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West Supp. 1993). 
12 N.J. REV. STAT. § 54:34-2.1 (1986). 
13 W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8D-1(4) to -1(5) (1992). 
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stepfamilies could be treated just like biologic families; that is, 
the same legal rights enjoyed by biologic parents and children 
could be extended to stepparents and their stepchildren. In-
deed, a number of the existing laws dealing with stepfamilies 
for specific purposes put them on par with biologic families. 
Under the New Jersey inheritance tax statute quoted in the 
preceding paragraph, biologic children and qualifying stepchil-
dren enjoy the same preferential tax rates and exemptions, as 
the beneficiaries of a deceased parent or stepparent. A second 
illustration of equivalent treatment of parent-child and step-
parent-child relationships appears in the laws goveming the 
discipline of children. In most states, stepparents who stand in 
loco parentis to their stepchildren are entitled to discipline 
them and are subject to the same limitations on the use of force 
as biologic parents. 14 
The biologic family is not, however, the only model for 
defining legal rights in the stepfamily. For example, state law-
makers have articulated entirely different child support respon-
sibilities for parents and stepparents. 15 In most jurisdictions 
today, stepparents have no enforceable obligation whatsoever to 
support their stepchildren. But even in the eighteen states 
which have imposed statutory stepchild support duties, 16 they 
are much less significant than the corollary responsibility of 
biologic and adoptive parents. Most notably, the obligation of a 
stepparent does not survive the termination of the marriage 
which created the stepfamilyY This durational limitation 
14 See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.61(a)(l) (West 1974) (authorizing 
reasonable use of force by parents, stepparents, and others standing in loco paren-
tis). 
15 See Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the 
Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38, 43-45 (1984). 
16 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 50l(b) (1981); HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-4 
(1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 252A.2(1) (West Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 205.310 (Baldwin 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.400 (Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 40-6-217 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-706 (1989) (criminal nonsupport); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62.044 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 546-A:1 to 
-A:2 (1987); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 415 (McKinney 1983); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW 
§ 101 (McKinney 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
10, § 15 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.053 (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 
§ 25-7-8 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45-4.1 to -4.2 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
15, § 296 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.205 (West Supp. 1993); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 49.195 (West Supp. 1992). 
17 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 296 (1989) ("A stepparent has a duty 
to support a stepchild if they reside in the same household ... for so long as the 
marital bond creating the step relationship shall continue."). But see N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 14-09-09 (1991) (extending stepparent support duty "during the marriage 
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stands in stark contrast to the universal rule in the biologic 
family, where support obligations continue at least until chil-
dren reach the age of majority. Professor David L. Chambers 
has pointed out that the current law of support in stepfamilies 
(no obligation following divorce) and in natural families (full 
support responsibility during every child's minority) does not 
exhaust the available options; for example, a post-divorce step-
parent obligation could be imposed for a shorter period of time 
than the duty of biologic parents. 18 
In reassessing the scope of legal rights and responsibilities 
in the stepfamily, lawmakers need not be limited to the options 
of accepting or rejecting rules that apply in the biologic family. 
As to each legal issue, lawmakers must determine whether the 
family-related policies that justify regulation in the biologic 
family also extend to the stepfamily, and if so, what form of 
regulation is appropriate in this nontraditional family setting. 
Ill. THE EXAMPLE OF INCEST REGULATION 
Many of the general observations made in the preceding 
discussion about formulating a sound legal definition of the 
stepparent-child relationship can be applied to the specific topic 
of incest regulation. In this field, both the threshold issue of 
identifying legally significant stepfamily relationships and the 
subsequent determination about appropriate forms of regula-
tion are complex and difficult to analyze. The summary of ex-
isting state civil and criminal incest statutes, which appears in 
the Appendix, reveals a striking lack of consensus about these 
matters. The following discussion provides an analytical frame-
work for reconsidering the legal regulation of sexual and mari-
tal relationships between steprelatives. 
A. Historical Development of the Law 
The laws in every state decisively forbid marriage or sexu-
al activity between close biologic relatives, such as siblings or 
parents and children. 19 Historically, the canon law of the 
Catholic Church, which governed this subject in England before 
and so long thereafter as the stepchildren remain in the stepparent's family"). 
18 David L. Chambers, Stepparents. Biologic Parents, and the Law's Percep-
tion of "Family" After Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 102, 127-29 
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990). 
19 See generally GEORGE THORMAN, lNCESI'UOUS FAMILIES 10-15 (1983) (defm-
ing incest in the biologic family). 
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the Reformation, treated steprelatives and other persons relat-
ed by marriage just like blood relatives.2° For example, mar-
riage between brothers and sisters was forbidden; marriage be-
tween stepbrothers and stepsisters was similarly prohibited 
because they stood in a close relationship of affinity, created by 
the marriage between their parents. 21 The coverage of 
steprelatives was continued in subsequent acts of Parliament 
and in the early statutes in the United States.22 As time 
passed, however, these restrictions were lifted in many of the 
state laws regulating marriage and sexual activity between 
relatives. 
Currently, the ban on incestuous relationships is enforced 
under two types of state regulations. First, the civil laws gov-
erning marriage deny all recognition to attempted marriages 
between close relatives. And second, a variety of criminal laws 
punish attempted marriages, as well as sexual activity outside 
of marriage, between family members. 
As to steprelatives, the civil marriage laws in just twelve 
states currently ban marriages between designated stepfamily 
members; the criminal laws in nine states outlaw attempted 
marriages; and twenty-nine states include certain stepfamily 
members within the definition of special crimes relating to 
nonmarital sexual activity within the family. In formulating 
and applying these laws, state legislatures and courts have 
expressed widely differing viewpoints about the strength of 
various public policies that justify incest regulation generally, 
and their application in the stepfamily. 
B. The Theoretical Justifications for Regulation 
Modern doctrine in this area has been influenced by the 
multiple theories propounded by sociologists and legal scholars 
to justify incest regulation.23 Ironically, these various theories 
tend to point in divergent directions on the issue of stepfamily 
restrictions. This lack of theoretical consistency helps to ex-
plain the inconsistency among state laws. 
20 See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 21-24 (2d ed. 1988). 
21 !d. at 23. 
22 ld. 
23 See generally SYBIL WOLFRAM, IN-LAWS & OUTLAWS: KINSHIP AND MAR-
RIAGE IN ENGLAND 161-85 (1987) (discussing historical development of the various 
theories that explain incest regulation). 
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For example, one traditional justification for regulation of 
family relationships involves the biomedical concern that the 
offspring of close relatives will suffer abnormally high rates of 
recessive genetic abnormalities. This analysis, which is pre-
mised on the common genetic makeup of close biologic rela-
tives, obviously has no application to persons, like 
steprelatives, who are not related by blood.:l4 By contrast, a 
second explanation draws upon religious history, viewing the 
current laws as an extension of earlier ecclesiastical doc-
trines.25 Under this analysis, the clear religious tenets that 
outlawed sexual and marital relationships between 
steprelatives in past centuries continue to have modern vitali-
ty. Thus, the genetic and religious theories of incest regulation 
provide inconsistent answers to the stepfamily question. 
Another theory relies upon community norms as the source 
and rationale for laws regulating incestuous relationships. 26 
For example, most people in American society would pre-
dictably disapprove of the marital or sexual relationship estab-
lished between a parent and his or her adult child; the univer-
sal outright ban on such relationships reflects this viewpoint. 
The pertinent inquiry relating to relationships of affinity is 
whether the same public disapproval would extend to the union 
between a stepparent and his or her adult stepchild. The re-
sponse to that question may well be, "it depends." If the step-
parent had assumed a parenting role toward the stepchild, 
then the subsequent marriage or sexual relationship between 
the two would arguably offend community norms about inces-
tuous behavior. On the other hand, if no real family ties had 
ever existed between them, then the subsequent union between 
an individual and the adult child of his or her former spouse 
would be more likely to escape criticism. 
Another important model for understanding the regulation 
of marriage and sexual relationships between close relatives 
24 See ALA. CODE § 13A-13-3 commentary at 558 (1982) (noting that the 
"notion of 'tainting of blood' ... does not apply to ... stepchildren and adopted 
children," who are nevertheless included in this criminal incest statute); WOLFRAM, 
supra note 23, at 138-47 (discussing the relationship between this genetic theory 
and the decline of regulation in the stepfamily). 
25 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2 cmt. 2(a) (1980). 
26 See id. at § 230.2 cmt. 2(d) (''Where there is a general and intense hostil-
ity to behavior, a penal law will neither be accepted nor respected if it does not 
seek to repress that which is universally regarded by the community as misbehav-
ior."). 
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emphasizes the welfare of the family members themselves.27 
According to this theory, the incest ban strengthens and stabi-
lizes family relationships by removing the potential for sexual 
unions and jealousy within the family household. As with the 
application of community norms, concerns about socialization 
would most likely be raised in stepfamilies where the members 
have functioned as a family unit. In other cases, the concerns 
about rivalries, insecurity, or insularity within the family 
would be less relevant. 
A final justification for the regulation of sexual relation-
ships between close relatives is the protection of weak family 
members from sexual overreaching by more powerful relatives, 
especially during childhood. 28 According to this rationale, legal 
regulation should extend to those stepfamilies where, by virtue 
of the roles assumed by the parties, the potential for overreach-
ing exists. Numerous studies of abusive families have estab-
lished that this protective concern is relevant in the stepfamily 
context.29 
Thus, the various theories that explain and justify the 
legal prohibition of incestuous relationships emphasize the 
welfare of individual family members, the stability of the fami-
ly unit, and the religious and moral interests of the larger 
society. They do not, however, provide a consistent guide for 
the proper treatment of stepfamily members. 
C. The Joint Classification of Laws Regulating Sexual 
Activity and Marriage 
An additional complication arises in the analysis of this 
topic because laws regulating several distinct types of behavior 
have generally been classified together as incest regulations. 
Thus, the laws in this field determine the legitimacy of the 
marriage contracted between a surviving spouse (stepparent) 
and the adult child (stepchild) of his or her deceased partner. 
At the same time, this system of rules must address the crimi-
27 See JOSEPH SHEPHER, INCEST: A BIOSOCIAL VIEW 135-50 (1983) (discussing 
the theories of Sigmund Freud and the family socialization school as they relate to 
incest regulation). 
28 See MoDEL PENAL CODE § 230.2 cmt. 2(e) (1980) ("(Incest] laws have 
operated primarily against a kind of imposition on young and dependent females."). 
29 See, e.g., W.D. Erickson et al., The Life Histories and Psychological Pro-
files of 59 Incestuous Stepfathers, 15 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 349 (1987); 
Patricia Phelan, The Process of Incest: Biologic Father and Stepfather Families, 10 
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 531 (1986). 
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nal responsibility of a stepparent who engages in sexual activi-
ty with the minor stepchild with whom he or she resides. Both 
the marriage regulation and the criminal law, which direct the 
outcomes in these two situations, are classified generally as 
incest regulations. In the biologic family, both the attempted 
marriage and the sexual relationship between a parent and his 
or her child would easily be characterized as incestuous and 
unlawful under relevant state laws. A single line of analysis 
may not, however, produce a satisfactory outcome in the two 
hypothetical situations involving stepfamily members. 
The Model Penal Code illustrates this problem. A single 
provision of the Code criminalizes marriage, cohabitation and 
sexual intercourse between designated family members. 30 The 
drafters expressly excluded steprelatives from this provision 
with the following explanation: "Because there are situations 
where persons related by affinity should be permitted to marry, 
it therefore follows that they should not be included within the 
incest prohibition."31 Thus, the Code's monolithic approach to 
the topic of stepfamily relationships, emphasizing the subject of 
marriage eligibility, foreclosed any separate consideration of 
the policy concerns raised by sexual activity between stepfamily 
members outside of marriage. 
A more refined approach, which separately addresses the 
issues of marriage regulation and criminal nonmarital sexual 
activity, has been taken in a number of recent state statutes. 
This approach enables lawmakers to consider relevant policies 
relating to religion, morality, the family institution, and the 
protection of children separately in the two discreet settings. 
Not surprisingly, among the states that have used this bifur-
cated model, stepfamilies have found their way most often into 
the laws regulating sexual activity outside of marriage. 
D. Criminal Statutes that Include the Age Factor 
An additional refinement, relating to the victim's age, ap-
pears in many modern criminal statutes. The traditional incest 
laws, like the Model Penal Code provision described in the last 
section, prohibit marriage and/or sexual activity without regard 
to the age of the parties. By contrast, statutes enacted in about 
one-third of the states combine the age of the victim with the 
30 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2 (1980). 
31 !d. at § 230.2 cmt. 3(b). 
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parties' family relationship as elements of the criminal offense. 
Although the purposes of these statutes tend to overlap with 
the purposes of the "statutory rape" laws, which prohibit sexual 
activity with underage partners, they also protect special fami-
ly-related interests.32 Stepparent-child relationships are in-
cluded in almost all of the laws that combine age and family 
relationship. 
The factors employed in these state statutes are designed 
to identify situations where a power imbalance exists in the 
family, similar to the authority exercised by parents over their 
children. For example, the North Carolina "sexual offenses with 
certain victims" felony statute proscribes sexual activity on the 
part of "a defendant who has assumed the position of a parent 
in the home of a minor victim."33 Similarly, West Virginia 
defines the term "custodian" in the "[s]exual abuse by a parent, 
guardian or custodian" statute to include "the spouse of a par-
ent . . . where such spouse . . . shares actual physical posses-
sion or care and custody of a [minor] child with the parent."34 
Both statutes would apply to stepfamilies when the stepparent 
plays an active parenting role with respect to minor stepchil-
dren. 
E. Traditional Incest Laws that Exclude the Age Factor 
Stepfamily members are included less often in the tradi-
tional incest laws, which regulate marriage and/or sexual activ-
ity between close relatives without regard to age. Currently, 
forty-nine states and the District of Columbia retain civil re-
strictions on marriage between certain biologic relatives; forty-
four states have laws criminalizing marriage and/or sexual 
conduct without regard to age.35 Steprelatives are included in 
fewer than one-half of these civil and criminal statutes. For 
example, the Wyoming felony incest statute provides: 
[A] person is guilty of incest if he knowingly commits sexual 
32 A study that summarizes all of the criminal laws involving sexual activity 
with minor victims, in which the element of family relationship is one of several 
variables noted, appears in JOSEPHINE BULKLEY & LUCY BERLINER, CmLD SEXUAL 
ABUSE AND THE LAW: A REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION NATIONAL 
LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION (2d ed. 1982). 
33 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7 (1986). 
34 W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8D-1, -5 (1989 & Supp. 1992). 
35 A compilation of theses statutes and related information appears in the 
Appendix. 
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intrusion ... or sexual contact ... with an ancestor or de-
scendant or a brother or sister of the whole or half blood. The 
relationships referred to herein include relationships of ... 
[s]tepparent and stepchild.36 
As to adult biologic relatives, this statute may still reflect 
all of the historical goals of incest regulation relating to genet-
ics, religion, morality, community norms, and the family insti-
tution. The additional questions raised by extending this tradi-
tional type of regulation to adults related by marriage were 
highlighted in the recent case of State v. Buck.37 There, an 
appellate court in Oregon upheld the conviction of a stepfather 
for incest, based on his sexual relationship with an adult step-
daughter, after rejecting the defendant's request to read an age 
limitation into the criminal incest statute. The ruling reflects 
the view that meaningful state policies continue to justify this 
limitation on the freedom of adults to select sexual partners 
outside the biologic family. 
Numerous policy interests are implicated for stepfamilies 
in the broader type of regulation applied in Buck. First, the 
vulnerability of stepchildren in the family may continue beyond 
their age of majority, thereby justifying the ban on adult rela-
tionships. Second, stability and harmony in the stepfamily may 
be enhanced by the restriction on sexual relationships between 
consenting adults. Third, the broad application of criminal 
prohibitions on sexual activity without regard to age may, in 
fact, vindicate the views of the community, past and present, 
regarding moral behavior in the stepfamily. A contrary view 
about the proper weight to be assigned to these considerations 
is reflected in the laws in the majority of states, where sexual 
activity between adult stepfamily members is not regulated. 
F. Stepfamilies and the Freedom to Marry 
Additional considerations enter into the analysis when the 
state seeks to restrict the freedom to select a marriage partner. 
First, personal freedom in this area is entitled to protection in 
the absence of compelling reasons to limit individual choice.38 
36 WYO. STAT. § 6-4-402 (1988). 
37 State v. Buck, 757 P.2d 861 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). 
38 See Carolyn S. Bratt, Incest Statutes and the Fundamental Right of Mar-
riage: Is Oedipus Free to Many?, 18 FAM. L.Q. 257 (1984); Leonard P. Strickman, 
Marriage, Divorce and the Constitution, 15 FAM. L.Q. 259, 279-97 (1982); Note, The 
Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1159, 1248-70 (1980). 
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Furthermore, the enforcement of marriage restrictions fre-
quently results in serious hardship for the parties of de facto 
unions. Of course, compelling justifications have nevertheless 
been found for the universal ban on marriages between close 
biologic relatives. By way of contrast, the laws in only nineteen 
states currently extend the civil and/or criminal ban on mar-
riage between close relatives to stepfamily members. 
The decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Rhodes v. 
McAfee39 provides a focal point for analyzing the laws that 
prohibit marriage between steprelatives. In Rhodes, the court 
invalidated the fourteen year union between B.E. Plunk and 
Gladys Griggs under a state statute banning stepparent-child 
marriages. The stepfather, B.E. Plunk, first married Gladys' 
mother, Tula Griggs; thereafter, Gladys resided for a number of 
years in the household created by her mother and stepfather. 
Five children were born during the marriage of B.E. Plunk and 
Tula Griggs, which ended in divorce in 1943. Regrettably, the 
Rhodes opinion does not indicate the parties' ages nor the dura-
tion of this first marriage. In 1944, B.E. Plunk married his 
stepdaughter Gladys Griggs, and the couple subsequently had 
three children. The Rhodes case involved Gladys Griggs' claim 
to the economic rights of a surviving wife, particularly home-
stead and dower rights in B.E. Plunk's property, following his 
death in 1958. 
The opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court emphasized 
the public policies involved in the regulation of marriage be-
tween close relatives, including the moral standards of the 
community and the harmony and stability of the family. Ac-
cording to the court, these policies were embodied in the Ten-
nessee statutes that prohibited marriage between stepparents 
and stepchildren and were properly applied to the relationship 
between Gladys Griggs and B.E. Plunk: 
[TJhe statutes here at issue ... are expressive of settled pub-
lic policy in this State regarding public morals and good order 
in society .... This case is a good example of why such mar-
riages are prohibited. The stepdaughter lived in the home 
with the mother and stepfather ... [and her] status in this 
family would be closely akin to the natural children of a 
mother and stepfather .... If there were no statutes prohibit-
ing such marriages, there not only could but very likely would 
39 Rhodes v. McAfee, 457 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1970). 
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[be] discord and disharmony in the family.40 
From the court's viewpoint, the family first created by the mar-
riage of B.E. Plunk and Gladys Griggs' mother, Tula Griggs, 
was analogous to the biologic family for these purposes. 
The Rhodes opinion failed to address a countervailing con-
sideration, namely, the serious hardship imposed upon Gladys 
Griggs and her children under Tennessee law. Of course, this is 
the inevitable burden imposed by any rule of law that invali-
dates de facto marriage unions. The law of Tennessee still 
reflects the view that this type of burden is justified in the 
stepparent-child setting by the public policy concerns identified 
in the Rhodes opinion.41 In contrast, the legislatures in most 
states have assigned greater weight to the interests of individu-
als like Gladys Griggs and eliminated all civil and criminal 
restrictions on marriages between stepparents and stepchildren 
after the prior marriage of the stepparent to the child's parent 
has come to an end. 
In 1986, Parliament amended the English Marriage Act in 
an effort to balance the competing policies involved in this situ-
ation. The Marriage Act, which previously banned all marriag-
es between stepparents and stepchildren and certain other per-
sons related by affinity, now provides that the marriage be-
tween stepparent and stepchild, or between stepgrandparent 
and stepgrandchild, 
". . . shall not be void by reason only of that relationship if 
both the parties have attained the age of twenty one at the 
time of the marriage and the younger party has not at any 
time before attaining the age of eighteen been a child of the 
family in relation to the other party."42 
The Marriage Act defines "child of the family" to mean "a child 
who has lived in the same household as [the steprelative] and 
been treated by that person as a child of his family."43 
The result for Gladys Griggs under this provision would 
likely be the same as under the Tennessee statute applied in 
the Rhodes case. Because she resided as a child in the home of 
her mother and stepfather, the subsequent marriage between 
40 ld. at 524. 
41 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-101 (1991). 
42 Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) Act 1986, § 1, reprinted in 
27 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 562 (4th ed. 1987). 
43 Id. 
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Gladys Griggs and her stepfather would remain unlawful under 
the reformed English law. Still, the Marriage Act is a thought-
ful attempt to limit the prohibition on marriage between step-
parents and stepchildren in order to avoid undue interference 
with their individual rights. No similar reform of the marriage 
laws has occurred in the United States. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In summary, the current laws regulating sexual activity 
and marriage between stepfamily members reveal a wide vari-
ety in the legislative treatment of these issues. A comparative 
analysis of the various statutory approaches to stepfamily regu-
lation raises several questions. First, do family-related policies 
exist in this context that justify legal limitations on the behav-
ior of stepfamily members? If so, what restrictions are appro-
priate? And finally, how should the stepparent-child relation-
ship be defined for the purpose of regulating sexual activity 
and marriage between the parties? 
Several insights, derived from the analysis of existing laws, 
are helpful in answering these questions. First, the needs of 
children deserve special consideration in the formulation of 
laws regulating sexual behavior within the stepfamily. Second, 
the separate treatment of marriage regulations and the restric-
tions on nonmarital sexual conduct makes sense in the context 
of stepfamilies. Finally, the definition of the legal stepparent-
child status can be limited for these purposes to cases where 
family ties have been established between the parties. The 
recent reform of the English marriage law embodies this ap-
proach, as do the state criminal laws that require an in loco 
parentis relationship between defendants and their minor vic-
tims. 
Mter accounting for the age factor, the distinction between 
marriage and sexual activity outside of marriage, and the im-
portance of de facto family ties in the stepfamily, the evalua-
tion of stepfamily regulations still requires a careful balancing 
of competing policy considerations. The interests of individuals 
in freely selecting sexual and marriage partners must be bal-
anced against the interests of the state in protecting the family 
institution and the mores of the community. A reasonable 
scheme of regulation, like that embodied in the English Mar-
riage Act, might permit marriage and sexual activity outside of 
marriage between stepparent and stepchild in situations where 
family-related policies are likely to be weakest. For example, 
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personal freedom may be protected in cases where no de facto 
ties were established between the parties while the child was a 
minor or resided as a family member in the stepparent's house-
hold. On the other hand; upon revisiting these issues, lawmak-
ers might decide to strike the balance in favor of greater, or 
lesser, protection of personal freedom for stepfamily members. 
A comprehensive legal definition of the stepfamily is an impor-
tant goal for the family law system of the Twenty-first Century. 
Reassessment of family-related policies, as they apply to non-
traditional families in the field of incest regulation and in 
many other areas of the law, is an important step toward 
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